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on the destructive aspects of religion, although they admit that reli- 
gion is no panacea for a democracy. This rise of a more balanced 
and appreciative account of religion’s role in liberal democracy 
bodes well for both liberal political theory and Christian public the- 
ology. In this essay, I will consider several works that are represen- 
tative of this trend. The literature relevant to the debate about reli- 
gion and liberalism is immense; my limiting principle here is to 
focus on two kinds of recent works by American and British au- 
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wo postulates about religion’s place in contemporary liberal 
democracies hold wide sway in academic literature. One is T that religion is increasingly insignificant in public life; the 
other is that it is too divisive to be constructive in that forum. Take 
as representative of these positions two well-received works by 
leading French intellectuals. Marcel Gauchet’s The Disenchant- 
ment ofthe World (1  997) argues that religion has finally come to its 
end in modern societies. The rise of the state some five millennia 
ago initiated the slow withdrawal of the gods from human society, a 
process brought to its logical conclusion by Christianity, which has 
unwittingly contributed to its own privatization. By contrast, Gilles 
Kepel holds that religion is back with a vengeance: around the 
world, religious groups and movements became significant politi- 
cal factors in the 1980s and 1990s. Kepel’s dismay at the resurgence 
of conservative political movements in Christianity, Judaism, and 
Islam is suggested by his title, The Revenge of God (1994). Al- 
though there are ways to hold onto a part of both theses simulta- 
neously, in their strong forms they obviously contradict one 
another. Surely one of them must be correct? The books presently 
under review suggest another possibility: both theses are wrong. 
Despite the perceptions of religion held by such writers as 
Gauchet and Kepel, scholars from a number of disciplines have 
been discovering and elucidating religion’s constructive role in lib- 
eral democratic societies. To Gauchet, these authors say that reli- 
gion is by no means politically feeble; it has shaped and continues to 
shape the political, economic, and cultural systems that govern 
modem societies. To Kepel, they say that it is inappropriate to focus 
thors: those in which liberal philosophers and religious thinkers de- 
bate the role of religion in liberal society and those by Christian 
theologians and ethicists who explicitly engage contemporary lib- 
eral theory. These books demonstrate that the debate between reli- 
gious thought and liberal theory has grown less strained and more 
constructive in the last few years. 
The Liberalism of Reasoned Respect 
Liberal democracy as a political system has been much in demand 
for its commitment to liberty, equality, human rights, and limited 
government. Witness, in the past decade, pro-democracy demon- 
strations in such countries as China, Indonesia, and Iran and the suc- 
cessful though fragile strides toward freedom under constitutional 
government in South Africa, Nicaragua, and the satellites and coun- 
tries of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, the theory of lib- 
eralism is under fire as never before, even among defenders of the 
liberal democratic system. Scholars and the general public alike 
have been finding the liberal paradigm unsatisfying for numerous 
reasons, among which are its implications for religious citizens. To 
understand the works under review, we must first have a clear and 
sympathetic description of liberal democracy as a system and a the- 
ory. 
Anyone who hazards a definition of liberal democracy hastens to 
add that there are a number of varieties. Liberalism, a family of 
philosophical thought with roots in the Enlightenment, prizes the 
rational self and seeks to protect the self s liberties through commit- 
ments to limited government, human rights, and the free market. 
Democracy is a family of approaches to political organization 
wherein power ultimately resides with the people themselves, who 
prototypically exercise it through the ballot. Liberalism and democ- 
racy tend to go hand in hand despite the tensions between the indi- 
vidualist motif of the former and the majoritarian motif of the latter. 
Making the linkage explicit, Nicholas Wolterstorff in Religion in 
the Public Square (1997) names four core ideas that animate liberal 
democracy: citizens enjoy equal protection and equalfreedom un- 
der the law; through the vote they possess an equal voice in political 
decisions; and the state takes a position of neutrality regarding the 
diversity of religions and other worldviews within society. Then he 
adds two qualifications. First, this is an ideal type, for “no society is 
anything than more or less a liberal democracy” (70). Second, the 
term liberal has come to apply both to existing liberal democra- 
cies-such as the US, the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands-and to 
a theoretical framework, “the liberal position.” The liberal position 
holds that the proper goal of political action is justice (or a broader 
social good that includes justice), the meaning of which is to be de- 
termined by a process that is neutral with regard to religious and 
other worldviews. These qualifications are points too often glossed 
over. Among other things, they entail that liberal democracies all 
deviate in some ways from the ideal of the liberal position. Liberal 
theorists will either have to make some room for these deviations, 
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including certain accommodations for religion, or show why and 
how they can justly be eliminated. 
That the latter task is neither as simple nor as desirable as many 
liberal theorists have supposed is the view of most contributors to 
Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, a collection of eleven es- 
says, which emerged from a conference held at the University of 
Notre Dame in 1996. For the purposes of the debate, Paul 
Weithman, the organizer of the conference and editor of the vol- 
ume, coins the tern “the liberalism of reasoned respect” (LRR). 
This strain of contemporary liberalism keys on the same ideas as 
those Wolterstorff identifies in the liberal position. With the goal of 
moving toward “an ideal well-ordered society of civility and mutual 
respect,” proponents of LRR “attempt to isolate a set of values and 
principles that reasonable citizens could willingly and publicly en- 
dorse as the basis of that society’s political arrangements” (4). 
Given the pluralism of modem societies, it is assumed that religious 
values and principles cannot serve this function. LRR seeks neither 
to marginalize nor privatize religious belief; it wants simply to iden- 
tify the proper set of common values that can guide political cooper- 
ation. How is this to be done? For John Rawls, the most influential 
representative of LRR in the American academy, the shared base of 
values for a constitutional democracy is its own political culture as 
refined through the lens of public reason. Public reason refers to the 
way citizens and public officials should explain, defend, and pro- 
mote their political views: by employing reasons that are accessible 
to all reasonable fellow citizens and that do not rely upon any partic- 
ular worldview, whether religious or secular (Rawls 1996,212-54). 
Rawls’s proposal is subjected to stringent examination in Religion 
and Contemporary Liberalism. Except for Robert Audi and Martha 
Nussbaum (and Weithman, who as editor takes no stance), the con- 
tributors to this volume criticize the ideal of public reason and, more 
generally, find that LRR’s social ideals of well-ordered civility and 
mutual respect are not as valuable as proponents suppose. 
The Virtues of the Liberal Citizen 
Despite the appeal of LRR’s social ideals, three charges can be lev- 
eled against this version of liberalism: it is unfair to (at least some) 
religious citizens, it is undemocratic, and it removes valuable re- 
sources from public deliberation. Religion in the Public Square sub- 
jects this version of liberalism to defense and scrutiny. The respect- 
ful and constructive dialogue between Robert Audi and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff centers on the virtues of a liberal citizen: should a good 
liberal citizen appeal to his or her religious beliefs when making a 
political argument? (The dialogue takes this form: each author 
presents an essay on the central question, each makes a substantial 
rejoinder to the other, and Audi concludes with a final statement 
summarizing the state of their debate and offering questions for fur- 
ther investigation.)’ Audi says that a citizen may make such an ap- 
peal-legality is not the issue here-but should not. His reasoning 
is similar to Rawls’s on behalf of public reason. Liberalism stresses 
liberty, so the problem of coercion looms large. It is not fair to sub- 
ject your fellow citizens to coercive policies, such as taxation and 
policing, for reasons they cannot understand or potentially agree to. 
By using religious reasons in political argument, a citizen is sug- 
gesting that the government should take the action in question for a 
religious reason. If the government allowed that religious reason to 
inform its decision, citizens who do not share the reasoning would 
feel alienated, if not oppressed. Thus, citizens and officials have a 
moral duty to find and use secular reasons whenever possible-rea- 
sons whose force does not depend on God, theological doctrines, or 
religious authorities. Audi encapsulates the argument in two princi- 
ples. The principle of secular rationale “says that one has a prima 
facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or public policy 
that restricts human conduct, unless one has, and is willing to offer, 
adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support” (25). The 
principle of secular motivation says that one has the same obliga- 
tion to abstain from advocacy unless one is sufficiently motivated 
by a secular reason. 
One obvious objection from the standpoint of religious faith is 
that these principles appear to require religious citizens, as Stephen 
Carter puts it, “to split their public and private selves” when they en- 
ter the public forum and “to remake themselves before they are al- 
lowed to press policy arguments” (1993, 8.56). Audi says that al- 
though religious and civic motives are distinct, we should expect 
them often to cooperate. He expresses this expectation in theprinci- 
ple of theo-ethical equilibrium: “where religious considerations a p  
propriately bear on matters of public morality or of political choice, 
religious people have a prima facie obligation-at least insofar as 
they have civic virtue-to seek an equilibrium between those con- 
siderations and relevant secular standards of ethics and political re- 
sponsibility” (37). Now this may appear to place another burden on 
the religious citizen, but Audi thinks that Western monotheists will 
find a great deal of coherence between their religious ethics and sec- 
ular ethics. Both a person’s secular and religious reasons will be 
tested and improved by the search for equilibrium. If religious be- 
lievers are encouraged to seek out this equilibrium, they will tend to 
become virtuous citizens who can find both religious and ade- 
quately secular reasons for their political judgments. Thus not only 
do these principles help to secure a political consensus on laws and 
principles ofjustice, but they also provide religious citizens with an 
appropriate way to move from their religious reasons to secular po- 
litical ones without having to bracket their deeply held beliefs. 
Wolterstorff disagrees with Audi’s central contentions, arguing 
that the liberal position is unacceptable in any version. His critique 
is made largely on epistemological grounds. The liberal position 
holds that “the appropriate source of the factual and moral convic- 
tions on the basis of which determinations about justice are to be 
made ... [is] independent of any and all of the religious perspectives 
to be found in society” (73). This “independent source” must be 
such that it is fair to ask all citizens to base their political judgments 
upon it. Religious principles must not come into play at all, unless 
they happen to be yielded by the independent source. Otherwise, 
when it comes to political debates and decisions, citizens “are to al- 
low their religious convictions to idle” (73). Wolterstorff examines 
the independent sources proposed by John Locke, Rawls, and Audi. 
All of them, he believes, are epistemically flawed: Locke failed to 
realize the science of morality he hoped for; Rawls fails to achieve 
the nontheoretical concept of justice he promises; and Audi’s prin- 
ciples require citizens to construct onerous and unnecessary philo- 
sophical reasons for their political positions. Wolterstorff finds all 
independent sources to be politically empty and unfair to those citi- 
zens whose religious convictions dictate that they ought to base 
their decisions concerning justice on their faith. 
Moreover, the procedure of using an independent source greatly 
misreads what politics is all about. Rawls, Audi, and other propo- 
nents of LRR deeply hope for consensus and believe we can achieve 
it if we just temper our language and our thinking enough, if we just 
leave some of our differences at the door of the town hall. 
Wolterstorff finds it extraordinary that contemporary proponents of 
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the liberal position are still looking for “the politics of a community 
with a shared perspective” (109). (It is indeed ironic that this aspira- 
tion emerges from those so attuned to the pluralism of modem soci- 
eties.) The aspiration is perhaps a noble one-it is one form of the 
age-old quest for the common good-but Wolterstorff throws down 
the gauntlet: “I think that the attempt is hopeless and misguided. We 
must learn to live with a politics of multiple communities” (109). 
Wolterstorff sees no reason to upset the established political cul- 
tures of liberal democracies, where decisions are taken mostly by 
majority vote, with procedures in place to protect the rights of mi- 
norities. 
This book is a model of clarity, careful thinking, and reasoned di- 
alogue. It makes a valuable contribution to the religion and liberal- 
ism debate because the co-authors write with nuance and are willing 
to rethink and revise parts of their arguments. Despite their dis- 
agreements, the authors keep in view their shared aspiration for a 
just and good society that maximizes citizens’ freedom and pro- 
motes social justice. On three core ideas of liberal democracy they 
more or less agree: equal freedom, equal protection, and equal 
voice. They disagree on whether the core idea of neutrality is to be 
interpreted as the state’s separation from all religious institutions 
(implying that the state should avoid actions that in any way benefit 
religion and religious groups) or its impartialiry among religions 
(which would allow actions that benefit religions on a nonpartisan 
basis). Likewise, they disagree on whether civic virtue requires citi- 
zens to reach for secular reasons and motivations. 
Audi should be praised because he parts company with the typi- 
cal proponents of LRR by engaging in careful analysis of Western 
religion’s coherence with the liberal tradition and by acknowledg- 
ing the beneficial contributions of religious citizens to liberal soci- 
eties. He avoids caricaturing religion as inherently divisive and op- 
pressive. Yet to my mind, Wolterstorff has the better of the debate. 
In particular, his argument that liberals are uneasy with majoritarian 
democratic institutions is a brilliant turn that has sent proponents of 
LRR backpedaling, as seen in Audi’s strained rejoinders (137-38 9 168-69) and Rawls’s emendations to his ideal of public reason. 
Wolterstorff s argument points to the larger question of what it 
means for a liberal society to have a common good. Liberals need to 
make their own thoughts on this matter clearer, but perhaps they 
should not give up the game too quickly. Even if there should be 
(virtually) no restraints on religious speech in a liberal society, does 
not the liberal position have important cautions to raise about using 
religious reasons to justify laws and public policies? 
Problems of Law and Policy 
The most contentious issues in the religion and liberalism debate 
fall into the domain of law and policy. How should the state take no- 
tice, if at all, of the religious beliefs of its citizens? May a govern- 
ment or any of its officials employ religious reasons for their ac- 
tions? May a government hinder or promote any religious 
activities? These questions are treated by a number of the authors 
under review. (For a discussion of more works on law and religion, 
see Cookson 1999.) In the US, issues of constitutional interpreta- 
tion come immediately to the fore. Ronald Thiemann’s Religion in 
Public fife is a useful roadmap through the thickets. Thiemann is a 
Christian theologian who argues that liberal philosophy and Su- 
preme Court adjudication since the late 1940s have wrongly tried to 
limit or exclude religion’s valuable role in public life. The question 
should be, not how to keep religion out of politics and public life, 
but what religion should properly do in those spheres. Thiemann’s 
guiding principles throughout are that religious citizens should be 
as free as possible to practice their faith, with all the public ramifica- 
tions this entails, and that religious groups as civic associations 
have something valuable to contribute to democratic life. 
Although not a constitutional scholar, Thiemann has a fairly 
good handle on the deliberations underlying the creation of the First 
Amendment. Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of ‘‘a wall of separation 
between church and State” became “common constitutional par- 
lance” when cited by Justice Hugo Black in the Everson v. Boardof 
Education decision of 1947 (42). Thiemann argues that behind Jef- 
ferson’s and James Madison’s wariness of public religion was Mad- 
ison’s belief that human nature tends to a self-interest that breeds 
factions. This theory of factions has not served the US well, accord- 
ing to Thiemann, because it is too pessimistic about human nature 
and loses sight of the common good. Thiemann claims that the 
American founders relied so heavily on this concept that they left 
successive generations no guidance as to appropriate civic virtues. 
“Madison’s position regarding the balance of powers only indicates 
how these [public] vices can be neutralized; it tells us nothing of 
how public virtue can be nurtured in the populace” (24). Likewise, 
the founders “are silent on the question of whether religion might 
function to foster the virtues requisite for the pursuit of justice and 
equality in the nation” (27). Thiemann’s brief against the factional 
theory is well taken, but he strains credibility in arguing that such 
men as Madison, Jefferson, Washington, Alexander Hamilton, 
Benjamin Franklin, and others had nothing to say about public vir- 
tue or religion’s assistance in its promotion. 
Thiemann thinks the Supreme Court has undermined the First 
Amendment over the last 50 years through rulings that give farmore 
priority to the Establishment Clause (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion”) than the Free Exercise 
Clause (“or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”). Criticizing each 
bloc of justices in their approaches to the religion clauses, he would 
have the Court rethink its doctrines, tossing out the metaphors of 
separation, neutrality, and accommodation and instead interpreting 
the two religion clauses as one unit founded on the “basic constitu- 
tional values of freedom, equality, and equal respect” (166). 
Thiemann does not detail an approach beyond stating basic princi- 
ples, nor does he explain how they should be used in adjudication. 
He does give some brief examples of what their use would yield in 
Establishment cases, where, it seems to me, he ends up taking essen- 
tially the liberal bloc’s line-the one exception is that he would al- 
low “moments of silence” in the public schools. An item that could 
test whether Thiemann’s approach has anything new to offer is gov- 
ernment aid to religious schools. Of this he states only, “Govern- 
ments should be permitted to provide parochial schools with the 
same type of aid offered to nonreligious private schools, as long as 
such aid does not directly contribute to the advancement of the reli- 
gious subject matter taught in the school” (167-68). It is not clear 
what Thiemann’s permission of equal assistance implies for the 
controversial and growing practice of state-sponsored school 
voucher plans, because his qualification is ambiguous. Thiemann 
should clarify the matter and answer several questions: Is the free 
exercise of religion hampered if some families use tax monies to 
choose a religious private school rather than a public or nonreli- 
gious private one? If religious institutions should be considered 
equivalent to other voluntary associations, why should not govern- 
ment include them among the institutions that advance a public 
good such as education? If Thiemann is giving up the notion of neu- 
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rrality as deleterious, then what is left to him but Wolterstorff s 
commendation of impartiality-an interpretation that Wolterstorff 
says obviously permits tuition vouchers for religious schools on an 
equal basis with other schools (1 15-16)? 
Despite these criticisms, Thiemann’s readable essay builds a co- 
gent case that liberal philosophy and liberal democracies should be 
more open to the contributions of religion. He handily disposes of 
the myths that religious belief is inherently irrational and incompat- 
ible with democratic tolerance. His argument would be strength- 
ened, however, by amplification and better illustration of his 
oft-made claim that religious groups make valuable contributions to 
democracy. 
A well-developed and concrete case for Thiemann’s claim 
would help quell the suspicions of some liberals that religion re- 
mains a divisive political force. A few essays in Religion and Con- 
temporary Liberalism suggest such worries. Take that of Martha 
Nussbaum. She notices that the liberal commitment to liberty of 
conscience and a range of other rights occasions a dilemma in cases 
in which religions threaten basic rights, especially in non-Western 
countries. Liberals tend to hold back because cross-cultural judg- 
ments seem to be an imposition of Western beliefs, hence violating 
the liberty of conscience of the religious majority of another coun- 
try. Nussbaum holds that liberalism should have no such qualms: 
when people’s basic rights are violated-Nussbaum focuses her ex- 
amples specifically on women-liberalism should vigorously con- 
demn such practices whether they are based in religion or not. In 
making these judgments, she seems to take a basically Rawlsian ap- 
proach to public reason, saying that religious discourse is appropri- 
ate if it can be made publicly accessible and intelligible to citizens 
who do not share its presuppositions. Although some types of reli- 
gious discourse and practice should be legally prohibited, others 
should merely be criticized as immoral and improper in the public 
sphere. The former approach is generally warranted when the basic 
rights of a person, especially in a negative form (rights against harm 
and hindrance), are fundamentally threatened. 
Even though Nussbaum focuses on some of the negative mani- 
festations of religious practice, it would be incorrect to say that she 
finds religion inherently oppressive or irrational; indeed, she specif- 
ically disavows such an attitude. Still, the way she frames the matter 
is telling. She works backward from examples of religion going too 
far and tries to determine where the boundaries should be drawn. 
This method, perhaps inadvertently, reinforces the impression that 
religion is seen as a problem by liberals. The method also casts the 
matter of religion’s role in liberal society largely in terms of nega- 
tive toleration: you should accept others’ rights to think and say 
what they want as long as they do not harm anyone. She does not 
mention the positive side of toleration: the value of respectfully en- 
gaging the thoughts of someone who thinks differently from you. 
She says too little, in my view, about the value of diverse ways of 
thinking, the inherent goods of a pluralist society, and the potential 
contributions that religions as particular moral traditions might con- 
tribute to the progress of liberal democracy (related to this is her dis- 
avowal of religion as a basic human good [1990]). On the other 
hand, Nussbaum notes that “religious discourse, if a villain in many 
of my examples, is also, in multiple and powerful ways, a major 
source of hope for women’s future. We should therefore not accept 
any solution to the liberal dilemma that unduly marginalizes reli- 
gious speech, or asks people to cut themselves off from humanitar- 
ian motivations that may motivate them in a specifically religious 
form” (135). Certainly Nussbaum’s concluding recommendations 
for interreligious dialogue, helpful practices, and citizen education 
would be strengthened if complemented by an exploration of reli- 
gious groups’ roles in such activities. 
Churches in the Public Realm 
Along those lines, some authors seek to focus our attention on what 
religious citizens and groups actually do: what they have done for 
the common good and what role religious belief plays in their politi- 
cal action. The idea is to turn the investigation in a constructive di- 
rection by asking what we can hope from religion rather thanfear 
from it, John Coleman and David Hollenbach in the Weithman vol- 
ume consider sociological data and theory, putting these in dialogue 
with their Christian-ethical perspectives (they particularly esteem 
the sociological studies of Casanova 1995; Putnam 1993 and 1995; 
and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Coleman draws on socio- 
logical theory and interviews with members of six 
paradenominational groups that promote citizen activism or educa- 
tion. These avenues lead him to an account of civil society, which he 
considers an overly neglected topic in these debates. Civil society is 
the arena of “secondary” (or “voluntary” or “mediating”) associa- 
tions-groups that people join voluntarily and that occupy a middle 
place between the individual and the massive organizations of the 
state and the market. Among civil society’s virtues is its role as “the 
seedbed for the moral life”: through participation, we learn virtues 
and values that make social life possible and, indeed, richer (281). 
One such institution is obviously the church. Hollenbach argues 
that the decline in some forms of civic participation can be coun- 
tered by citizens’ vital participation in churches. Based on research 
showing that churchgoers develop higher levels of social skills than 
nonchurchgoers, Hollenbach proposes that “more church activism, 
not less, would seem called for if more active, more egalitarian rep- 
resentation in democratic politics is judged desirable” (299). 
I find these contributions useful to the debate because they go be- 
yond theorizing about the ideal relationship between religion and 
liberalism to argue that liberal democracies in fact greatly benefit 
from the civic activities of religious citizens and groups. The claim 
prompts another question: should religious groups be thought of the 
same way as other secondary associations or do they bring some- 
thing distinctive to the public square? To say that churches are at 
least as valuable as other secondary associations is important in it- 
self, since often, as Thiemann argues, they are the one kind of insti- 
tution regarded with suspicion as a result of the standard liberal in- 
terpretation of church-state separation. But are churches essentially 
no diflerenr from any other association, as one might assume from 
reading Thiemann? Coleman and Hollenbach suggest that religious 
groups are carriers of spiritual meaning and moral values in ways 
superior to other groups. Religious believers are in their work “for 
the long haul,” as one of Coleman’s interviewees puts it (286); they 
are typically able to find more intrinsic value in their volunteerism 
and to rely upon their frameworks of meaning to sustain them 
through daily disappointments. Both authors also highlight the pro- 
phetic role of religion: religious speech and action in the public 
square can transform politics by reorienting corrupted values and 
championing the dignity of neglected persons. Such transforma- 
tions were seen in the faith-based abolitionist and civil rights move- 
ments; Rawls’s public reason is unable to account for such reorien- 
tations of the public’s notion ofjustice (see Stiltner 1999,58-65). In 
sum, Coleman and Hollenbach propose that religions should be un- 
derstood both as like other associations and as having distinctive 
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public value. Their arguments flesh out the convictions of such 
theologians as Thiemann that religion is valuable in public life and 
address the desire of such commentators as Nussbaum to see reli- 
gion advance the cause of positive toleration and respect for human 
rights. 
Public Theology 
Normative religious thinkers will want to complement sociological 
arguments for the churches’ positive contributions with a theologi- 
cal understanding of how church activities might be sustained and 
grounded. This is the province of what in Christianity has been 
called political theology or public theology. Its central question is 
how to understand the Christian church’s relationship to the politi- 
cal society in which it abides. The question has been considered by 
practically every Christian ethicist and significant theologian of 
modem times; it is a question that goes back to the beginning, but 
especially to Augustine. Augustine’s distinction of the earthly and 
the heavenly cities in The City of God has bequeathed public theol- 
ogy an enduring tension between two ends of a spectrum: should the 
church sharply separate the interests and the fortunes of the two cit- 
ies, making little if any attempt to shape the political order, or 
should it seek close cooperation with the state to advance the causes 
ofjustice and the common good? Between the extremes of quietude 
and a self-effacing quest for “relevance,” most Christian theolo- 
gians and movements have staked out positions that try to acknowl- 
edge both the dijferent ends of church and state and their shared in- 
terests in ajust social order. Still, choices must be made. Today the 
attitudes of public theologians run the gamut from those very criti- 
cal of contemporary liberalism to those who find significant overlap 
between Christianity and liberal thought. 
One option, given the church’s long, intertwined history with 
liberal democracy, is to present Christian theology as a contributor 
to public discernment. Duncan Forrester presents such a case in 
Christian Justice and Public Policy. His starting point is the percep- 
tion that we are in a situation in which “nobody knows what justice 
is,” but, unfortunately, too many people think they know (38-41). 
The proliferation of perspectives, especially the communication 
gap dividing conservatives and progressives that runs through all 
public debates, makes it difficult indeed for a pluralist society to 
guide its public policies toward justice. What can Christian public 
theology add to the cacophony? 
Forrester thinks it would be wrong to answer “everything” or 
“nothing” (195-96). Christian public theology cannot provide 
top-down answers, but it does transmit “theological fragments” to 
the public forums of democratic societies. Given that Christian be- 
liefs have shaped Western democracies through their history, it is to 
be expected that some fragments of the notion of Christian justice 
survive in secular theories of justice. Yet secular theories, such as 
those of Rawls, F, A. Hayek, and Jiirgen Habermas, are inadequate 
as they stand. Christian justice presses beyond justice as fairness; 
the theological fragments that round out justice are love, commu- 
nity, and hope. The task of public theology is to draw out the impli- 
cations of secular theories, make connections to these theological 
fragments, and provide a constructive voice and committed exam- 
ple in the public square. Forrester’s public theology is laudably at- 
tuned to concrete social injustices and the realities of pluralism; un- 
fortunately, the three blocks of the argument-a survey of policy 
debates over prisons and poverty in the UK, a theological critique of 
secular theories of justice, and an account of the theological frag- 
ments-are virtually freestanding, leaving the reader to speculate 
about the connections. His desire is to avoid a grand theory that will 
fail to deliver on its promises; rather, he lauds such theologians as 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth, who “simply by unselfcon- 
sciously doing as serious theology as they could often exercised 
considerable impact in the public realm” (36). Yet I suspect readers 
will wish that Forrester had indicated how Christian public theol- 
ogy can engage policy debates and influence their terms and results. 
A more vigorous option is to incorporate liberalism under a 
Christian umbrella. In the Weithman volume, J. L. A. Garcia criti- 
cizes the turn that liberal theory took when it cut off its account of 
human rights from a substantive view of human sociality. Garcia 
commends Pope John Paul 11’s view of humans as inherently inter- 
personal creatures in need of God’s guidance. He then goes further 
than any other contributor to the Notre Dame conference in suggest- 
ing that a religious consensus around this understanding of the hu- 
man person could serve as the foundation of political life in the US: 
“For all Rawls’[s] emphasis on the plurality of comprehensive doc- 
trines in our society, the great majority of people hold religious be- 
liefs within the Jewish and Christian traditions. There is, therefore, 
considerable unity within the diversity. Might not reliance upon this 
underlying agreement, a passive and latent consensus in contrast to 
the constructed and explicit one Rawls imagines, achieve a broad 
and lasting base of support for a widely shared conception of justice 
based on a human dignity that is rooted in our status as image of 
God?’ (248). Does Garcia mean for this religious vision of freedom 
to serve as a consensus for social morality in the realm of civil soci- 
ety or as the foundation of laws and policies in the realm of the state? 
Garcia suggests the more robust answer when he rhetorically asks, 
“How specifically would a society’s following my suggestion that 
the state employ a religiously informed picture of human freedom 
violate [civic friendship]?” (249). 
No more than this is said about the state, but Garcia opens a can 
of worms here by appealing to a specifically religious conception of 
human nature and the world as a legitimate basis for governance. 
Liberals who use an independent source argue that no such doctrine 
should undergird a liberal political order. Their strategy may be dis- 
criminatory or self-defeating, as Wolterstorff, Garcia, and others ar- 
gue, but how then are we to understand the foundation ofjustice and 
the common good in a liberal society? In Garcia’s invocation of a 
Christianized political culture, we have an answer in the tradition of 
Thomas Aquinas, who saw much more overlap between the goals of 
church and state than Augustine did. Yet this answer strains our 
ability to recognize the account as liberal in any meaningful sense. 
Note, though, that Garcia’s is only one of many possible ways to 
follow out Aquinas’s ideas; some Thomists will focus more on nat- 
ural law as the foundation of a cross-cultural account of justice and 
human rights, while others will blend in to their Thomism a signifi- 
cant dose of Augustine’s realism. 
Robert Song follows the latter strategy in Christianity and Lib- 
eral Society. His reasons for engaging liberal theory and practice 
are similar to Forrester’s, as is his conviction that Christian faith and 
action make invaluable contributions to public life. Song builds his 
essay around three theologians who critically appropriated liberal- 
ism in the twentieth century-Reinhold Niebuhr, George Grant, 
and Jacques Maritain. These theologians show “the limits and dan- 
gers of liberalism from a theological point of view”: Niebuhr de- 
flated liberalism’s progressive, utopian philosophy of history and 
Grant’s account of the dynamics of technology “pointed up the p 
tential instability of liberalism and the real possibility of historical 
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decline” (214). By promoting a “new Christendom” and a “demo- 
cratic charter” of basic human rights, Maritain sought to rescue the 
moral goods of liberalism from its false commitment to neutrality. 
Song commends the direction of Maritain’s arguments but proposes 
that his thought, which reflects Aquinas’s positive attitude toward 
government, would benefit from being placed in a framework 
marked by Augustine’s realism. 
Forrester, Garcia, and Song think the church’s attitude toward 
society, liberal or otherwise, should be one of critical and construc- 
tive engagement. Taking a cue from Karl Barth, Song says the 
church must say both “no” and “yes” to liberalism (226). The other 
two would affirm this advice in different degrees. Garcia’s “no” to 
contemporary liberalism is strident, while his “yes” is conditioned 
on liberalism being transformed by Christian culture. Forrester 
speaks a “no” to liberal theories ofjustice in the sense that they are 
incomplete; his “yes” is to their rudimentary insights that must be 
completed by Christian justice. Song’s view of what liberalism 
lacks is as trenchant as Garcia’s: “Transcendence is unavoidable: 
either it will be offered through the Feligion or religions of the soci- 
ety, or it is liable to be established by the demonic absolutization of 
the liberal state” (220). Yet Song’s Augustinian approach is wary of 
directly infusing Christian faith into public culture, let alone public 
policy. “In its disabused view of public rationality and its refusal to 
regard pluralist political forms as regrettable lapses from the norm, 
Augustinian thought can recognize the dangers of Christianity im- 
posed from above, whilst also allowing that there may be genuine 
benefits for justice from a Christian political inspiration” (2 15). 
Perhaps the most difficult thing about doing public theology is 
moving from theory to practice. I criticized Thiemann for being un- 
clear about Establishment Clause adjudication and Forrester for not 
connecting his theological fragments to the policy issues he sur- 
veys, but many authors do not even do as much as that. Some public 
theologians, taking a strong stance against the quest for relevance, 
lay out the practice of public theology almost solely in terms of 
church life-often leaving unanswered questions about the 
church’s relation to liberal democracy. Those who find that their 
theology requires critical acceptance of a pluralist, liberal democ- 
racy have the task of connecting their theological claims to the pub- 
lic debate. Why should those who are not Christians listen? Either 
way, Augustine’s dilemma remains: how much peace dare the 
church make with the political order? 
Conclusion 
Liberals’ efforts to assess accurately and appreciate critically reli- 
gion’s role in a liberal democracy and the care taken by theologians 
to approach liberalism with nuance bode well for both liberal theory 
and public theology. Such efforts will promote needed learning, 
discussion, and debate across disciplines, as modeled by Religion 
and Contemporary Liberalism and Religion in the Public Square. 
The tone and results of these investigations will be guided by the 
participants’ answer to this question: is religion a political force 
merely to be tolerated or one whose beneficial effects should be 
welcomed? One important perspective to emerge from these books 
is the understanding that liberals are not unconcerned with commu- 
nity. Indeed, in their quest for a political consensus around the 
meaning ofjustice, they echo the classic Aristotelian and Thomistic 
discourse of the common good. But can such a quest harmonize 
with the democratic objective of letting everyone having a say, es- 
pecially when the powerful yet multiple voices of religious groups 
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are thrown into the mix? In other words, what are the options for 
pursuing the common good in a liberal democracy? 
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